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ABSTRACT

An Exploratory Analysis of the Psychological Dimensions of Airline Security and Correlates of
Perceived Terrorism Threats: A Study of Active American Airlines Pilots

by
Paul M. Borowsky

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attack resulted in a myriad of new policies designed to
enhance aviation security. These policies ostensibly considered the origins of the exact threat
facing the United States. Missing, however, were the inputs from rank and file pilots of the
airlines that policy makers were attempting to protect. This exploratory study distributed a 50question survey designed to measure pilot perceptions of security risk and threats. Univariate
descriptives were used to examine the extent to which sample data approximated the population
of interest. Factor and reliability analysis were used to document the multidimensionality of the
constructs and assess the appropriateness of the linear combination of variables used to construct
the scales. Finally, correlation analysis was used to better understand which areas of airline
security might be targeted by policymakers to enhance existing structures and practices. Results
revealed statistically significant differences in the perceptions of pilot security concerns and the
focus of current U.S. aviation security policy.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
September 11, 2001, will be remembered as a day of violent and malicious terrorist
attacks against U.S. citizens and interests in a nonwar zone. Officially, 2,996 people were
confirmed dead or missing. Shortly thereafter, U.S. foreign policy was dramatically redefined as
well as political priorities, economic strategies, and U.S. connections with international allies. At
an individual level, the unprecedented tragedy may have affected U.S. citizens and their
perceptions of the future as well as expectations of daily life. Soon after 9/11 it was clear that
Americans were forever changed as a result of the attacks (Peterson & Seligman, 2003, p. 381).
America had been dramatically exposed to a form of warfare known as terrorism and, although
far from a new concept, it was the first time Americans had been exposed to it on such a large
scale. The issue facing Americans now became one of providing for security while preserving
individual liberty. More specifically, new policies and strategies would have to be formulated in
order to provide a safer, more secure, and more reliable air transportation system.
Following the attacks of 9/11 the United States Congress established the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, more commonly known as the 9/11
Commission. Its purpose was:
to investigate facts and circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, including those relating to intelligence agencies, law enforcement agencies,
diplomacy, immigration issues and border control, the flow of assets to terrorist
organizations, commercial aviation, the role of congressional oversight and resource
allocations, and other areas deemed relevant by the Commission. (The 9/11 Commission,
2004, p. xv)

9

The Commission report was designed to determine the location of weak areas, or fault lines, in
security policy and practices. It was assembled because “September 11, 2001 was a day of
unprecedented shock and suffering in the history of the United States, a traumatic event,
therefore giving rise to great anxiety about judgment and the assignment of blame” (The 9/11
Commission, 2004, p. xv). The Commission directly criticized the Federal Aviation
Administration, whose staff informed them that is was not their responsibility to tell airlines
what to tell pilots regarding security crisis on planes (Young, 2007, p. 35). The FAA did not feel
it was their responsibility to warn airlines or pilots of potential terrorist threats.
Many of these policies changed when President George H. W. Bush signed into law the
Air Transportation Security Act that was designed to improve the nation’s aviation security
system. The Act intended to change the way security is performed and administered for the entire
transportation industry. The Act contained specific deadlines for its new administrators such as
mandating a massive hiring of over 30,000 new screeners to occupy over 400 airports nationwide
(Sweet, 2004, p. 43). Clearly screening was a prominent early target of policymakers in the
defense of the nation’s airlines. Policy makers, however, never consulted with rank and file
pilots at American Airlines during any phase of post 9/11 aviation security policy formation.
Airline pilots are charged with the safe operation of multimillion dollar aircraft as well as
the lives of potentially hundreds of passengers on each flight. They fly up to 100 hours per
month, or 1,000 hours per year, while being subjected to various security processes at major
airports around the world. They observe ramp operations and security screening as well as
coordinate in-flight security with flight attendants and air marshals. The perceptions and intimate
local knowledge these pilots possess could help shape more effective airline security policy;
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however, no significant study has been found highlighting this valuable, unexplored area of
expertise. Understanding the perceptions of pilots and their observations of aviation security
could lead to more effective policy, which in turn could lead to a safer, more effective air
transportation system.
The objective of this exploratory study is to quantitatively measure the above mentioned
security perceptions of risks and threats that currently challenge post-9/11 aviation security as
perceived by pilots of American Airlines. Current U.S. policy has primarily focused on
passenger screening as the principal deterrent and last line of defense in keeping terrorists from
boarding commercial aircraft. The focus on screening, however, may be to the detriment of
other dimensions of airline security. The intimate local knowledge of rank and file pilots of
American Airlines may reveal dimensions that have been overlooked by U.S. aviation security
policymakers.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE LITURATURE
Defining the Enemy
The ancient Chinese warrior Sun Tzu taught his men to know their enemy before going into
battle. For if “you know your enemy and know yourself,” he wrote, “you need not fear the result
of a hundred battles.” However, Sun Tzu warned, “If you know yourself but not the enemy, for
every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat” (North, 2004, p. 1). The ancient words of Sun
Tzu, written over 2,500 years ago, are as relevant now as they were then.
Following the events of 9/11 the nation’s airline pilots were asking themselves who or
what the enemy was. Just 9 days later President George Bush attempted to answer that question
during a speech to the joint session of Congress. “Americans have many questions tonight,” he
said. “Americans are asking who attacked our country. The evidence we have gathered all points
to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al-Qa’ida.” He went on to
say that al- Qa’ida practices “a fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam.”
He further added that the “terrorists’ directive commands them to kill Christians and Jews, to kill
all Americans and make no distinctions among military and civilians, including women and
children” (As cited in Rubin & Rubin, pp. 321-322).
President Bush seemed very cautious to define the enemy as not Islam itself, but as a
radical offshoot of the religion that uses and perverts Islam to justify its methods for achieving its
goals. To further distance the terrorists from mainstream Islam he added the following:
I also want to speak tonight directly to Muslims throughout the world. We respect your
faith. It’s practiced freely by many millions of Americans and by millions more in
countries that America counts as friends. Its teachings are good and peaceful, and those
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who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah (As cited in Rubin &
Rubin, pp. 322-323).
He further added that the
terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself. The enemy
of America is not our many Muslim friends. It is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy
is a radical network of terrorists and every government that supports them (As cited in
Rubin & Rubin, pp. 322-323).
It is apparent great lengths were taken to define the enemy, and that definition would be used to
formulate new policies and strategies to help counteract any future acts of terrorism—especially
as it pertained to the commercial air transportation system.
Suicide bombing, however, is not a new phenomenon. It has been observed for well over
25 years, and has emerged as a defining characteristic of modern day terrorism. Since the early
1980s, the use of suicide bombing by terrorists and insurgent groups has grown exponentially. In
2004, suicide bombers carried out 163 attacks, striking targets in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan,
Israel, Turkey, and Uzbekistan. The final count for 2005 was approximately 360 suicide
bombings causing 3,000 fatalities (Lewis, 2007, p. 223). Furthermore, according to the U.S.
Department of State, in 2005, suicide bombings worldwide accounted for 20% of all casualties,
despite representing only 3.2% of all terrorist attacks. (As cited in Lewis, 2007)
The attraction of suicide bombings stems from their effectiveness. Judged in terms of
lethality and media exposure, suicide bombing is the best way for terrorists to carry out lethal
violence. Additionally, suicide attacks are relatively inexpensive, as long as the attacker’s life is
deemed a reasonable price to pay. For these reasons, suicide bombing has become the weapon of
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choice for organizations that wish to level the military playing field between themselves and
their better armed enemies. (Lewis, 2007)
On November 27, 2002, the Congress and President created The National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. The Commission was made up of 10 bipartisan
members with the sole purpose of determining why the nation was unprepared for the attacks,
how they happened, and what could be done to prevent any future occurrences (The 9/11
Commission, 2004). The Commission report was thorough in its findings and recommendations,
and further defined that:
Islam is not the enemy. It is not synonymous with terror, nor does Islam teach terror.
American and its friends oppose a perversion of Islam, not the great world faith itself.
Lives guided by religious faith, including literal beliefs in Holy Scriptures, and common
to every religion, and represent no threat to us (The 9/11 Commission, 2004, p.363).
Instead, the commission pointed to a “lack of imagination within the security and policy
communities as the most significant failure” (As cited in Lewis, p. 226). One explanation for the
United States’ vulnerability to suicide hijackings was due to U.S. intelligence’s community
inability to imagine passenger airliners being used as weapons despite the fact that al-Qa’ida had
already made use of suicide bombers for its most visible attacks (Lewis, 2007).
With the findings of the 9/11 Commission report the reorganization of the government to
assist U.S. Counterterrorism policy could be further refined. At that point, the enemy had been
clearly defined and recommendations were given to prevent any further terrorist acts. On March
16, 2006, President Bush released his second term National Security Strategy (NSS). The NSS
explains how the government is “working to protect the American people, advance American
interests, enhance global security, and expand global liberty and prosperity” (Bush, 2006, p. 3).
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The NSS again reiterates that “while the War on Terror is a battle of ideas, it is not a battle of
religions,” and that “transnational terrorists confronting us today exploit the proud religion of
Islam to serve a violent political vision” (Bush, p. 5).
Terrorism has many historical dimensions not seen in more common crimes. Events
occurring decades or even centuries ago can influence events in the present. More recent events
such as the invasion of Iraq result in connecting the past to the present in a constant stream of
terrorist events intended to serve some wider strategy. Muslim terrorists use this historical
perspective to restore their society to the ideal of a past perfect or transform their existing society
to meet some timeless ideal (Roach, Ekblom, & Flynn, 2005, p. 9).
Interestingly, terrorists do not perceive themselves as acting criminally. From their point
of view, their behavior is as rational as any other. This rationality, however, may exist more at a
group rather than individual level, some of whom may be deliberately psychologically
conditioned (Roach et al, 2005). Theorists speculate that potential terrorists are conditioned by
the following process:
Socialization. Potential terrorists are introduced to the values and attitudes of the existing
terror group. Through a process of socialization they begin to take on those values and
attitudes.
Moral disengagement. This process reorders the existing moral codes of conventional
behavior. It reduces the terrorist’s part in any death and destruction psychologically by
misrepresenting the harm done and blaming (or dehumanizing) the victims (akin to the
process where offenders ‘neutralize any feelings of guilt and remorse for their victims).
Attachment. Having achieved socialization and moral disengagement, the individuals
becomes psychologically attached to the terrorist group, which now gives meaning to
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their lives (especially where there is a religious overlay). The individual then finds it
impossible to leave the group – such withdrawal simply cannot be contemplated (Roach
et al., 2005, p. 11).
The importance of knowing your enemy is vital to U.S. interests. A great deal of current
U.S. counterterrorism strategy has been formulated based on the threat of rogue Islamist
terrorists and not the religion of Islam itself. But what if religion is the root cause of extremism
and dysfunctional behavior that clearly permeates modern Middle Eastern culture? Effective
policy and strategy is dependent on a clear understanding of who or what the United States is
fighting. If Islam is to blame than the question still remains whether or not current U.S. policy is
based on an adequate analytical understanding of Islam and Islamist Terrorism. Moreover, have
policy makers considered Islam as a contributing factor when creating and implementing
strategy?
It is difficult to imagine the current level of Middle Eastern conflict existing today
without Islam as the core value system and fundamental identity of the Middle Eastern people.
Simply put, without Islam there would be no Islamist Terrorism. Current U.S. policy makers
should be intimately familiar where ideological seeds are planted and how they continually
influence global terrorism. Without this knowledge a clear understanding of the enemy cannot be
ascertained and counterterrorism policy would be detrimentally affected.
A brief historical overview illustrates how fast the enemy goes from a simple group of
miscreants to a far more complex group of radical religious fundamentalists whose source of
violent ideological philosophies come from the religion of Islam itself. It should be noted that
unlike western religion and society, particularly Christianity in America, Islam is an all
encompassing way of life. It believes in the absence of separation between any earthly
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institutions and the religion itself. Thus, politics, government, law and education are institutions
guided and influenced by the teachings of Islam (Rubin & Rubin, 2002).
Modern Islamist terrorist ideology traces its roots to 1920s Egypt with the founding of the
Muslim Brotherhood by Hassan al-Banna. The Brotherhood is still in existence today, and finds
its doctrines and beliefs in all modern Islamist terrorist organizations. Because of this, it is
incumbent on U.S. policy makers to understand the philosophy and teachings of this
organization, why it found an audience, and what can be done to moderate it radical and harmful
beliefs.
The brotherhood believes Islam “applies to all nations and all people.” Furthermore, in
order to advance their dogmatic vision of a unified return to the so-called glory days of Islam,
they label any government that fails to share their vision as unworthy of leadership. Additionally,
they feel it is their responsibility to replace, through force if necessary, those governments
(Rubin & Rubin, p. 27). This view is central to all modern Islamist organizations. They see
themselves as liberators of sorts and desire to overthrow existing governments and install a pure
Islamic state in order to rid themselves of the corruption and western influence that has
supposedly hindered their nations from achieving greatness. Once this is complete, the state can
exist as it was originally intended by Islam. The Brotherhood believes it is the individual’s
responsibility to questions any government’s policies if they do not live up to the standards of
Islam as they interpret them. Al-Banna warned that any government that could not deliver, in
short order, would need to be replaced, and this “would inevitably lead to a revolution” (Rubin &
Rubin, 2002).
With the Brotherhood the seeds of modern revolution were borne in the name of Islam.
The idea of the path for Islam to reclaim its position of dominance and influence that can only be
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achieved by a revolutionary return to a pure state is at the center of conflict in the Islamic world.
Some believe in moderation, while others support violent revolution to achieve results. It is the
latter (found in the teachings and doctrine of the Muslim Brotherhood) that the U.S. is now
confronting; and that continues to spread its violent and disruptive ideology throughout the world
(Rubin & Rubin, 2002).
Eventually the teachings of Hassan al-Banna influenced an Islamic theorist named Sayyid
Qutb, who continued to refine and define the call for radicalism. And like al-Banna, his views
are represented today in all Islamist fundamentalist groups. For those who believe in a policy of
isolation from Islamic states in order to appease fundamentalists, than consider the words of
Qutb, written in 1955:
Some enemies of Islam may consider it expedient not to take any action against Islam, if
Islam leaves them alone in their geographical boundaries…But Islam cannot agree to this
unless they submit to its authority by paying jizya [a tax paid to Muslims by nonMuslims], which will be a guarantee that they have opened their doors for Islam and will
not put any obstacles in its propagation through the power of the state…. (As cited in
Rubin & Rubin, p. 32).
The Brotherhood’s teachings have found an audience with similar minded reactionaries,
some of whom would have a profound influence in future world events. One of those
reactionaries was Ayatolla Ruhollah Khomeini, who in 1942 said the following:
Those who know nothing of Islam counsel against war. Those [who say this] are witless.
Islam says: Kill all the unbelievers just as they would kill you all!...Islam says: Kill them
[the non-Muslims], put them to the sword and scatter [their armies]…Islam says: Kill in
the service of Allah those who may want to kill you!...Whatever good there is exists
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thanks to the sword and the shadow of the sword. People cannot be made obedient except
with the sword! The sword is the key to paradise, which can be opened only for holy
warriors! Does all that mean that Islam is a religion that prevents men from waging war?
I spit upon those foolish souls who make such a claim (As cited in Rubin & Rubin, p.
29).
Following the overthrow of the existing government, Khomeini became the supreme
leader of Iran in 1979 and remained in that post until his death in 1989. He clearly believed that
Islam urges all Muslims to seek the illusionary past perfect of Islam, violently if needed.
The Iranian revolution of 1979 was a call to reinstitute an Islamic state, one that was willingly
accepted by the masses. Islam does not fully separate politics, government, or the rule of law.
Religion is politics and politics is religion. To the followers of Islam there is no other way
(Rubin & Rubin, 2002).
The Iranian revolution galvanized the radical ideology that other Islamists groups had
been seeking. The people of Iran embraced a leader of that radical ideology. For most it was a
return to the purity of Islam and a chance to reclaim Islam’s rightful place in the world (Rubin &
Rubin, 2002).
Was Iran influenced by an individual who perverted Islam for his own personal gains and
agendas, much like the modern terrorists have been accused of? Or did the people of Iran
willingly follow because they believed in the message as much as the messenger himself? Are
the modern terrorists simply following a grotesque perversion of Islam, or are they legitimized
by the cultural influences of Islam and its followers? These questions are central to
understanding the enemy and shaping anti-terrorism policy. David Zeidan, a religious studies
expert, defines Islamist (peaceful and violent) goals as:

19

[a] restoration of Islamic glory [that] will be achieved by purifying society from unIslamic teachings and practices, by a return to Islam’s original pure sources (the Quran—
God’s written revelation through Muhammad, and Hadith, the divinely inspired traditions
of the Prophet’s sayings and deeds) as the only authority, and by the establishment of an
ideal Islamic state modeled on that of the Prophet and his Companions (As cited in Rubin
& Rubin, pp 11-12).
Zeidan argues that Islamists are motivated by the teachings of Islam and not on a
perverted interpretation of those teachings. Furthermore, he believes they “concentrate their
efforts on capturing the state and its centers of powers—either legally within the democratic
framework, or violently by revolution or coup d’etat,” and that:
[even though] fundamentalists are a minority in most Muslim societies and states , their
insistent and vehement discourse has had much effect on the Muslim world, moving into
the vacuum left by the failure of secular regimes, redefining orthodoxy, reconstituting the
boundaries of political power relations, limiting the borders of the permissible, resonating
in the hearts of the impoverished masses, and appealing to a new strata of literate people
with modern technical education (As cited in Rubin & Rubin, pp 11-12).
Zeidan emphasizes that Islamists are not perverting Islam but rather following the teachings of
Islam. This is in direct contradiction the aforementioned Bush administration’s view of whom
and what America is fighting in the global war on terror.
It is clear that Islam as a religion, as a complete and all encompassing way of life, can’t
be ignored when developing air transportation policy to combat modern Islamist terrorism. A
nation can kill, capture, or neutralize any number of terrorists, but if the basic value system
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(Islam) of a people says to continue fighting against a real or perceived enemy, then it may well
continue without end.
One should look no further than the ongoing unrest between Palestine and Israel to see
what fundamentalist Islam has done to undermine peace. History shows Israel has not been the
primary instigator of violence and has tried on numerous occasions to broker more peaceful
relations (CNN.com, 2006). Islam, however, and its well documented disdain for the Jewish
State, has continually frustrated any hopes of peace. The Arab world has been publicly calling
for the elimination of Israel since its creation in 1947. Indeed, as recently as 2006, Iran officially
stated Israel should be “wiped off the map” and that the Holocaust was a “myth” (CNN.com).
Is this hatred a modern day phenomenon? Are the policies of the West to blame for the
violence as is popularly believed? It is very likely that a great majority of westerners perceive the
conflict between Jews and Arab Muslims is largely to blame on the so called occupation of holy
lands by Israelis. This view, however, would be myopic when considering the words of the
prophet Muhammad himself:
Abu Huraira reported Allah’s Messenger (may peace be upon him) as saying: ‘The last
hour would not come unless the Muslims will fight against the Jews and the Muslims
would kill them until the Jews would hide themselves behind a stone or a tree and a stone
or a tree would say: Muslim, or the servant of Allah, there is a Jew behind me; come and
kill him’ but the tree Gharqad would not say, for it is the tree of the Jews (Bukhari,
4:52:176, 177 and 4:56:791).
Again, the recurring themes of violence can be found at the core of Islam and are still used today
by fundamentalists to justify their violent positions.
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Any discussion of the modern fundamentalist terrorist would not be complete without
examining the role of the martyr, or one who is willing to fight and die for Allah (God).
Martyrdom is part of all the great religions of the world, but the role it plays in Islam is a
fundamental difference between Islam and all other religions, particularly Christianity and
Judaism. In Islam, a martyr is defined as “the word for the confession or profession of faith,
indicating that [the] willingness to sacrifice all, even life itself, is the ultimate profession or
eternal witness of faith.”, and that this “provides Muslims with a model and ideology for protest,
resistance and revolutionary change” (Esposito, 2005, p. 14).
Without the concept of martyrdom Islamist terrorists may have a more difficult time
recruiting willing volunteers to sacrifice their lives for Allah. Martyrdom is firmly solidified in
the teachings of Islam, and as such will be very a difficult concept to change or moderate. The
prophet Muhammad spoke of martyrdom frequently, and his words, narrated by Abu, are telling:
The Prophet said, ‘The person who participates in (Holy battles) in Allah’s cause and
nothing compels him to do so except belief in Allah and his Apostles, will be
recompensed by Allah either with a reward, or booty (if he survives) or will be admitted
to Paradise (if he is killed in the battle as a martyr). Had I not found it difficult for my
followers, then I would not remain behind any sariya going for Jihad and I would have
loved to be martyred in His cause (Bukhari, volume 1, book 2, number 35).
The problem with martyrdom, filled with promises of abundant pleasures and rewards, is that it
could supplant the initial rationale for violence, which is the love of Islam and Allah. In other
words, dying as a martyr could become more important than actually achieving a strategic result
with that death.
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On the final evening prior to 9/11 attacks, 19 hijackers were given final instructions in
preparation for their “mission.” The instructions were believed to be written by Abdul Aziz alOmari and stated the following:
Let your breast be filled with gladness, for there is nothing between you and your
wedding [with God/paradise] but mere seconds. There will begin a happy and contented
life and immortal blessings with the prophets, the true ones and the righteous martyrs.
They are the best of companions. We beseech God for his graces. So seek good omens.
For the Prophet, May blessings and peace be upon him, used to love divinations about
every matter…Then recite the words of God, you are wishing for death before
encountering it, then you saw it, and are looking for it. And you wanted it (As cited in
McDermott, 2005, Appendix B pxx).
Violence, hatred, intolerance, and martyrdom, although found in all religions, appear to
be at the forefront of radical Islam. Furthermore, those teachings could be a prime contributor in
the recruitment of suicide bombers. Islam looks to be in turmoil, anachronistic, and in desperate
need of answers. Islamist fundamentalists ostensibly desire the return to past glory when Islam
ruled the Arab world by whatever means necessary, including destruction of life and property.
Moreover, it does not matter if potential victims are Muslim, Christian, Jewish, or any other
faith, as long as objectives are met
U.S. counterterrorism policy defines the enemy as a small group of disturbed ideologues
supporting a doctrinaire interpretation of Islam (Bush, 2006). The problem, however, appears to
be farther reaching and more challenging than finding a group of malcontents and arresting them
for bad behavior. The problem may be Islam itself, which is intertwined and inseparable from
any Muslim state or individual.
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Defining terrorists in simplistic terms is one characteristic of the global war on terror.
This is either a capitulation to the forces of political correctness or a grave error on the part of
current policy makers. The question going forward is what implications do these apparent
oversimplifications have for current U.S. counter-terrorism and airline security strategy? Are
these objectives sound, or do they require revision? What are the perceived reactions to these
policies by the very people who work in the airline transportation environment?
As mentioned previously, the President’s National Security Strategy released in March,
2006, outlines the Untied States’ plan to combat the global war on terror. While written in broad
strokes, it is clear that the strategy is organized, introspective, and realizes the enemy is more
than what is being publicly touted. The following is a key excerpt from the National Security
Strategy that reveals why Islam, as a religio-political entity, was considered during the
formulation of this strategy:
Our Nation’s cause has always been larger than our Nation’s defense. We fight, as we
always fight, for a just peace—a peace that favors liberty. We will defend the peace
against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building
good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging
free and open societies on every continent. In pursuit of our goals, our first imperative is
to clarify what we stand for: the United States must defend liberty and justice because
these principles are right and true for all people everywhere. No nation owns these
aspirations, and no nation is exempt from them. Fathers and mothers in all societies want
their children to be educated and to live free from poverty and violence. No people on
earth yearn to be oppressed, aspire to servitude, or eagerly await the midnight knock of
the secret police (Bush, pp. 2-3).
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The principles of liberty and justice, as western civilization understands them, don’t
appear to exist within Islamic countries. In his speeches President Bush is ostensibly attempting
to find common ground by addressing basic human instincts for self determination and freedom.
He is not addressing the values of a few, but rather an entire society. Islam would have to be
reinterpreted in order to incorporate these values. Bush further illustrates:
America’s constitution has served us well. Many other nations, with different histories
and cultures, facing different circumstances, have successfully incorporated these core
principles into their own systems of governance. History has not been kind to those
nations which ignored or flouted the rights and aspirations of their people (Bush, 2006, p.
3).
Interestingly, President Bush references entire nations and not simply individual groups: “We
will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by…supporting moderate and modern
governments, especially in the Muslim world, to ensure that the conditions and ideologies that
promote terrorism, do not find fertile ground in any nation” (Bush, p. 5).
The aforementioned quote is a strong reference to the ideologies of Islam that promote
terrorism and anarchy. It is these ideologies that must be addressed in order to help secure the
U.S. air transportation system. The National Security Strategy examines many other factors that
need attention in order to protect the United States from terrorism. It is a blueprint used in
determining a problem and outlining a solution. Of course, like all policy, it is only as good as
the agencies empowered to carry out its mandates. The Director of National Intelligence, whose
“job is to effectively integrate foreign, military and domestic intelligence in defense of the
homeland and of United States interests abroad” (Negroponte, 2006, p. 1), must also have a
broad understanding of the threat in order to counter it with effective policy.

25

A component of the Director’s responsibility is to devise and implement a National
Intelligence Strategy to complement the President’s National Security Strategy. The strategy’s
main priority is:
to inform and warn the President, the Cabinet, the Congress, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
commanders in the field, domestic law enforcement and homeland security authorities in
the homeland, and our international allies. In this sense, as President Bush has stated,
intelligence is America’s first line of defense... (Negroponte, 2006, p. 1).
An objective of the Intelligence Strategy is to “Anticipate developments of strategic concern and
identify opportunities as well as vulnerabilities for decision makers.” It seeks to accomplish this
by promoting “deeper cultural understanding,” and “better language proficiency…among
personnel at all levels” (Negroponte, 2006, p. 1). These passages indicate the U.S. is not merely
looking for a few common criminals. After all, law enforcement authorities didn’t need cultural
understanding when catching the bombers of the World Trade Center in 1993.
Examples from the 2006 National Security Strategy and National Intelligence Strategy
reveal an administration which understands Islam is a contributing factor and must be addressed
when formulating effective counter-terrorism strategy. The strategy framers are using language
of diplomacy to outline a plan for victory. This language should not be confused with a lack of
direction or understanding. It should be viewed as a tool for keeping different nations, religions
and cultures on the same “politically correct” page when attempting to define and implement
strategy and policy. Without factoring the religion of Islam as a contributor to the cycle of
violent ideologues that continue to emerge from Middle Eastern Islamic nations, the United
States would severely disadvantage herself from finding effective and lasting solutions to the
dangers of Islamist Terrorism.
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Historical Perspective
Terrorism is feared and loathed in every nation of the world. It is understandable given
the exposure terrorist attacks have been given in the media since 9/11. The seeming randomness
of violence and innocent lives targeted, however, lend a great deal to the fear and
misunderstanding of terrorism as a political weapon. The fact is, terrorism is a relatively rare
event that kills very few people—far fewer than civil wars, traffic accidents, or homicide
(Englhart & Kurzman, 2006, p.1958). The social disruptions generated by terrorist attacks and
the attention paid to them is responsible for the disproportionate level of concern given to these
attacks (Englhart & Kurzman, 2006). This is especially true with the perceptions of passengers
and employees of the nation’s airlines. Every day millions of passenger’s board thousands of
flights to hundreds of destinations without any disruption or delay attributed to terrorist activity,
yet terrorism remains among the greatest concern of a post 9/11 nation. To place it in proper
context, over 1.6 billion passengers boarded the world’s airlines in 2002, and 1.7 billion in 2003.
In the United States alone, there were over 675 million passengers in 2002 and over 682 million
in 2003 (Bricker, 2005, p. 615). A greater understanding of terrorism is necessary in order to
determine how certain groups, particularly airline pilots, perceive the threat of terrorism and their
ideas to secure against it.
The word “terrorism” finds its genesis in the Latin terrere, which literally means to
frighten. The first recorded use of the word is associated with the French Revolution’s “Reign of
Terror” during the 18th Century. Similarly, the U.S. Department of Defense defines terrorism as
the “calculated use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear, intended to coerce or try to
intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious,
or ideological.” Historically, terrorism has been designed to instill fear in whole populations by
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targeting a small, representative group. However, as the attacks by radical Islamist terrorists on
September 11, 2001, have shown, this historical perspective on terrorism may be changing.
Instead of waging proportionate attacks designed for maximum effectiveness, modern terrorists
now seek to inflict maximum damage and destruction as an end in itself, thus turning terrorism
into a war of annihilation (Miller, 2006, p. 127).
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States was suddenly plunged
into a new era of warfare. Although terrorism attacks were not a new concept, it was the first
sizable assault by Islamist terrorists to be executed on U.S. soil. Not since the 1941 Japanese
attacks on Pearl Harbor have the U.S. had to react to such a threat (Ranstorp, 1996 p. 43). The
question continues to be why such behavior and actions exist at all, and which policies can be
implemented to counteract that behavior.
Islamist terrorists have almost universally experienced a sense of crisis in their
environment, which has led to an increase in disaffected groups formed in response to this
problem. The crisis contains failings of social, political and economic dimensions of their
environment, which have resulted in a spiritual fragmentation and a radicalization of their society
(Ranstorp, 1996). Gaining an understanding of the motivations, issues and concerns of Islamist
terrorists may prove to be the most effective tool in countering the effects of such lethal
behavior.
The Media and Perceptions
Since the events of 9/11, the word and concept of terrorism have seeped into every facet
of America’s conscience. The economy, government, media, and, of course, transportation have
all been profoundly affected. Consumers in general have all been impacted by terrorist events in
the U.S. and other countries of the world. Despite ongoing efforts of the global war on terror, the

28

number of terror incidents around the world continues to grow in frequency. Given the spread of
terrorist organizations, the phenomenon of terrorism has become a social structural condition.
Despite the continued permeation of terrorism, our knowledge of it and its implications for
policy remain poorly understood (Shrivastava, 2005, p. 63). It is important to understand the
perceptions of those who are most at risk in the airline environment, and what are the
contributing factors to those perceptions.
The issues going forward include how to integrate the theoretical and practical, which
requires insight into the perceptions of those who are affected most from the emerging threat of
terrorism. As our society undergoes a radical change in airline security, so too will the
perceptions of the threat facing our public transportation system. In the U.S., new levels of social
anxiety over terrorism have surfaced since September 11, 2001, most specifically worries over
airline security in general (Welch, 2006, p. 94). These anxieties undoubtedly play a large role in
shaping existing perceptions of threat by airline pilots.
A day does not pass where the Global War on Terror is not highlighted in some manner,
specifically in the media. Understanding how the media chooses to report on terrorist incidents
has significant consequences for how the public perceives terrorism. Furthermore, policy makers
respond to terrorism and terrorists’ attempts to use media to accomplish their objectives
(Chemrak & Gruenewald, 2006, p. 431). The public relies heavily on news sources for
information about terrorism and its related impacts. The accessibility and frequency of the media
have altered how most Americans feel and perceive the threat of terrorism in the post 9/11 world
(Chemrak & Gruenewald, 2006).
Terrorism acts such as bombings and hijackings can satisfy multiple objectives for
terrorists including the realization of their cause, funding, strengthening resolve, and spreading
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fear and revenge. For groups or individuals who believe their concerns are being ignored,
terrorism becomes a powerful vehicle of communication to gain access to the world’s media
(Chemrak & Gruenewald, 2006). “There is no doubt that their [terrorists] deeds are planned and
executed with the mass media and their effects on the masses and governmental decision makers
in mind” (Chemrak & Gruenewald, p. 433). The American public has been bombarded with
highly mediated images of terrorists and terrorism events since September 11, 2001. Perceived
threats and heightened security alerts abound in daily media coverage, and political speeches,
leading to what may be termed a moral panic (Rothe & Muzzatti, 2004, p. 327).
The concept of moral panic has been used to define social issues for over 30 years. Cohen
(1973) was the first to present an inclusive definition of a moral panic. According to Cohen, a
moral panic occurs when:
A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat
to societal values or interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical
fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops,
politicians or other right-thinking people…Sometimes the subject of the panic is quite
novel and at other times it is something which has been in existence long enough but
suddenly appears in the limelight. Sometimes the panic passes over and is forgotten…at
other times it has more serious and long lasting repercussions and might produce such
changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the way society conceives itself
(Cohen, 1973, p. 9).
It is clear that exposure to the 9/11 attacks was largely felt through the media including
both media coverage of the actual attacks and the subsequent weeks of coverage, reviewed in
ever widening detail, of the horrific consequences. Additionally, the media repeatedly raised the
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prospect of future attacks against the U.S. air transportation system (Marshall et al, p. 305).
Unlike most disasters, the specific aspects of 9/11—its scale, unpredictability, novelty as a
threat, and implications for future safety, together with media saturation of graphic images and
frequent government warnings of future attacks—signaled the potential that there was a
significant ongoing threat, with greatly elevated risk for being harmed in additional attacks
(Marshall et al., 2001). It is this ongoing media assault that has undoubtedly helped shape the
perceptions of risk factors among active airline pilots in the United States.
The media coverage of terrorist attacks, training camps, interviews, or photo shoots
became part of the planning and strategy of terrorist groups. It is this exposure that unwittingly
makes the media accomplices in the success or failure of a terrorist’s goals (Vaisman-Tzachor,
2007, p. 55). Media reporting, in essence, becomes a recruiting partner and instrument in the
terrorist act. In essence, the media have become a primary vehicle used in advancing the terrorist
message, as well as a primary vehicle for recruiting new terrorists. Ironically, the Unites States
investment in the democratic principles of freedom of speech is the vehicle used to advance the
cause of many terrorist organizations around the globe (Vaisman-Tzachor, 2007).
Conversely, however, media reporters have been able to gain access to terrorist leader
and foot soldiers, their families, training facilities, etc., and provide insights into the minds of the
terrorists that few other organizations, if any, can provide. Despite this access, media information
about terrorists has been largely excluded from any serious consideration by the intelligence and
academic community’s thus far (Vaisman-Tzachor, 2007). Clearly, the media have a massive
influence, both positive and negative, in advancing or curtailing terrorist activities. This
influence is bound to shape and influence the perceptions of security matters among pilots of the
nation’s air carriers.
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The media play an enormous role in determining air transportation risk factors. The
problem is whether or not the media contribute to the threat of terrorism in a negative way.
Suicide missions are viewed as irrational or misguided acts of uninformed people driven by
despair or fanaticism. Even when the media report the possibility that a suicide bomber acts from
a real injustice, they still tend to accentuate the theme that grievances never justify violence. The
message is that violence expresses hate, which leads to reciprocal violence in destructive
escalations of hostilities. Who is actually blamed depends on which news outlet is reporting the
violence. Western (especially American) media generally blame the Palestinians and their
supporters for the ongoing violence between Arabs and Israelis, whereas non-Western media
such as al Jazeera tend to blame Israel and supporters, especially the United States (Turk, 2004,
p. 275).
The media employing sympathetic descriptions of terrorists and terrorism is a major issue
for counterterrorism policy. Governmental authorities and agencies are predisposed to
minimizing the risks of either sympathy for terrorists or public fear of terrorism. As such, the
implication for counterterrorism policy is to deny legitimacy to terrorist acts and to discourage
the media from granting too public a voice for terrorists and terrorist groups. As such, arguments
for and against censoring media coverage of terrorist events, including statements issued by
terrorists, are summarized below (Schmid & de Graaf 1982, p. 172). The dilemma for
government authorities however, is how to minimize publicity for terrorists without pushing
them into increasingly destructive acts (Turk, 2004).
Arguments for censorship:
Terrorists use the media for propaganda, which helps recruit new supporters.
Publicity is a major goal of terrorism.
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Detailed reporting of incidents gives potential terrorists suggestions and models for
action.
Information broadcasts during an incident can be useful to the terrorists involved.
Media presence can endanger hostages.
Reporting terrorist acts can lead to imitation.
Media reports may panic kidnappers into killing their victims.
People without respect for others’ lives should not be enabled to command public
attention by using violence.
Describing terrorist’s acts might promote sadism in some members of the public.
Reporting terrorist outrages might provoke vigilantism and revenge attacks on the group
for whom the terrorists claim to be acting.
Negative news is demoralizing. (Turk, 2004, p. 276).

Arguments against censorship:
Not reporting terrorist atrocities might lead people to less negative judgments of
terrorists.
Publicity can be a substitute for violence.
Censorship might force terrorists to raise the level of violence.
Not reporting terrorist events would encourage rumors, which might be worse.
Media presence can help prevent police actions that cause unnecessary casualties among
both terrorists and victims.
Censorship enables officials to label any dissidents as terrorists, thus undermining legal
safeguards.
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Media credibility would decline.
Lack of news might result in a false sense of security, leaving the public unprepared to
deal with terrorist attacks.
Lack of awareness would keep the public from understanding the political situation.
Feeling deprived of information might increase public distrust of the authorities.
Terrorists’ claims that democracies are not really free would gain credibility. (Turk,
2004, p. 277).
Reaction to 9/11
It appears the attacks of 9/11 and subsequent media coverage of the event have had a
dramatic influence on U.S. society. The creation of the Transportation Security Agency (TSA),
Department of Homeland Security, and FBI reforms are all examples of 9/11’s impact on
security policy. There has also been increased emphasis on the building of global partnerships
for sharing intelligence and data concerning terrorism. Furthermore, many states have developed,
or are developing, fusion centers to increase the exchange of information across government
sectors to improve the ability to fight crime and terrorism (McGarrell, Freilich, & Chermak,
2007, p. 143).
The blueprint for this new federal security system was the Homeland Security Bill, which
was signed into law by President Bush on November 26, 2002. The bill established the
Department of Homeland Security, resulting in the largest federal government reorganization in
the U.S. since the creation of the Department of Defense in 1947. Among its goals were to
reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism and prevention of further terrorist attacks (Fraher,
2004, p. 584). The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was created to protect the
nation’s transportation system and to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce.
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The TSA promptly hired and trained 45,000 federal screeners to fill positions at all 429 of
America’s commercial airports (Fraher, 2004).
These agencies are supporting the global war on terror and, as such, tend to be front and
center in media reports. This is especially true of the TSA, whose duties now include all
screening of passengers and baggage at our nation’s airports. Since 9/11, hundreds of media
reports have described the new stresses and hassles of air travel including long airport security
lines and threats of airline hijackings and bombings. Furthermore, media reports have suggested
that air travel stresses may lead to overwhelming levels of stress for those who work in the travel
industry (Bricker, 2005).
The mystery facing those charged with keeping airports safe in a global era is that of
keeping airports as accessible as possible to legitimate travelers and as inaccessible as possible to
illegitimate ones. Economic globalization depends on the liberalization of trade and reduction of
barriers to the flow of goods and persons (Lyon, 2006, p. 401). The only way to accomplish this
is by keeping airports as open and stress free to the traveler as possible.
The balance between civil liberty and national security has always been of paramount
importance to Americans. The tautological argument of how liberty can be secured without
losing that liberty is a central issue in a post-9/11 world. Unfortunately, the very freedoms and
liberties Americans value are often exploited by terrorists. The attacks of 9/11 ushered in a new
era of warfare in the form of Islamist terrorism. Unlike historically traditional wars, terrorism
presents an array of problematic security issues that previous generations simply did not have to
face. Generally speaking, past wars have been fought on foreign soil against well-defined
combatants. It was clear who the enemy was and what their objectives were. Present day
terrorism, however, uses very different tactics from those of the past.
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Screening and Policy
The majority of security measures have been designed to counteract the threat of
terrorism domestically as well as internationally. How effective those polices are is debatable on
many levels. Policy makers often fail to use the local knowledge of those who possess the most
intimate understanding of a given situation. Any large social process will inevitably be far more
complex than the structural framework we can devise to understand it (James, 1998, p. 309).
Because of these complexities it is vital that local knowledge, and not just that of chosen policy
makers, be used when formulating effective strategy and policy. This notion of local familiarity,
or mētis, is a Greek concept for comparing the forms of knowledge embedded within local
experience with the more general or abstract knowledge deployed by the government and its
technical agencies (Scott, 1998, p. 311).
Public policy should be informed by local knowledge combined with those of so called
“experts.” Rank and file employees of the air transportation system could be a helpful source of
knowledge and expertise when formulating security policy. Commercial transportation security
policy has clearly focused on passenger screening as the primary source of security. A 2003
Government Accounting Office report stated: “Passenger screening is critical to the security of
our nation’s aviation system, particularly in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is tasked with securing all modes of
transportation, including the screening of airline passengers. TSA has met numerous
requirements in this regard, such as deploying 50,000 federal screeners at over 440 commercial
airports nationwide” (Government Accountability Office, 2003, p. 2).
Additionally, a 2007 GAO report observed: “The Transportation Security Agency (TSA)
has identified the Transportation Security Officer (TSO) workforce as its most important asset in
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securing commercial aviation” (U.S. Government Accountability Office, p. 1). TSOs are
responsible for screening passengers and luggage to prevent dangerous items from coming
onboard commercial aircraft. As such, they are easily the most visible part of commercial
aviation security. The TSA deploys TSOs to the more than 400 commercial airports to monitor
passengers as they walk through metal detectors, examine carry on items on X-Ray machines,
and conduct more thorough inspections of passengers selected for additional screening (U.S.
Government Accountability Office, p. 2).
The impetus for this focus on screening probably had to do with the fact that 19 terrorists
made it through screening checkpoints on 9/11 with virtually no effort. Two weeks later, in a
joint hearing before congress, representatives of the Committee on Governmental affairs stated
that “this congress and this administration has to expeditiously develop a comprehensive plan to
ensure the safety of the traveling public, the security of our airports, and the continued viability
of the aviation industry. First and foremost I believe the federal government should immediately
take responsibility for the screening of passengers and carry on luggage and the control of
security checkpoints at our Nation’s airports” (Joint Hearing before the Committee on
Governmental Affairs, 2001, p. 1). In the same hearing, Senator Joe Lieberman added: “In light
of the tragic events of September 11, the adequacy of airport screening procedures if of
immediate, paramount, and of very wide concern to the American people and to members of
congress” (Joint Hearing before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, 2001, p. 2). The focus
on screening continued: “As again has been over and over said in the last two weeks and before
by the gentleman sitting before us and others, this screening workforce has been characterized as
underpaid, under trained, and under experienced, with turnover rates that sometime exceed 400
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percent…training and background checks for these employees is minimal” (Joint Hearing before
the Committee on Governmental Affairs, 2001, p. 6).
The focus on screening clearly dominated this hearing: “Last June, GAO reported that
screeners missed as many as 20 percent of dangerous objects at screening checkpoint”, “what
new procedures and technologies can be employed to improve screening,” “We do know that as
far back as the late 1970’s, both the FAA and the airlines characterized the performance or lack
of performance of screening personnel as significant and alarming,” “The first alternative is one
in which the air carrier would continue to be responsible for conducting screening…The second
alternative is one in which each airport authority would be responsible for screening…The third
alternative is based on a new DOT agency…created to conduct a national screening
program….And the fourth alternative is a new quasi-government corporation…created to
conduct a national screening program” (Joint Hearing before the Committee on Governmental
Affairs, 2001, p. 14).
The Greek concept of mētis, which is broadly understood to represent a wide variety of
practical skills and acquired intelligence in responding to a constantly changing human
environment, appears to be lacking in the formulation of post 9/11 aviation policy. The
aforementioned hearings on security were attended by Senators, Congressmen and
Congresswoman, committee members, and various other heads of fields relevant to the matters at
hand. Absent was the local knowledge of pilots, flight attendants, and other employee groups of
the nation’s airlines. Certainly union leadership was consulted later on in the process; however,
at American Airlines, no rank and file member has ever been asked for input regarding security
policy.
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Mētis is a valuable contributor to policy making because the skills required to operate in
a commercial aviation environment cannot be taught apart from engaging in the activity itself.
The observations and experiences of regular exposure to a particular environment simply cannot
be transferred to someone who does not have the same local knowledge (Scott, 1998).
Furthermore knowing how and when to apply the local knowledge in a concrete situation is the
essence of mētis. The subtleties of application are important precisely because mētis is most
valuable in settings that are fluctuating and indeterminate. Such local knowledge is particular and
can only be acquired by local practice and experience (Scott, 1998).
Post 9/11 aviation security policy has focused on screening to a large extent. However,
even prior to 9/11, the focus was on airport screeners. In an April 2000, Subcommittee on
Aviation Hearing, Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison planned to “introduce legislation that would direct
the FAA to improve training requirements for security screeners by September 30th of this year.
The FAA should require a minimum of 40 hours of classroom instruction and 40 hours of
practical, on the job training before an individual is deemed qualified to provide screening
services” (Hutchison, 2000, p 2).
Despite these “improvements” by policy makers to screener qualifications,
ineffectiveness continued to plague the system. Congresswoman Barbara Boxer addressed the
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on August 8, 2002: “At the beginning of
July, just a month ago, I was shocked to read that checkpoint screeners at airports in Los Angeles
and Sacramento were ranked in the bottom 5 airports for high failure rates. The examiners who
were doing these tests did not even attempt to hide weapons and the screeners still did not find
them” (Boxer, 2002, p. 2). Despite the continuing emphasis on screening within aviation policy,
it seems to be marginally better than it was prior to 9/11. According to the International Security
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Group, a security consulting company, “significant resources have been allocated since 9/11 to
improve aviation security in the United States. The area that has received perhaps the most
attention is the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) pre-departure screening for
commercial flights. Yet despite the infusion of resources for this activity, as well as for other onboard and on-site initiatives, progress appears uneven and a number of important security gaps
remain” (Wienek, 2005, p. 1).
The focus on screening has become the face of airline security policy. No other post 9/11
change is more visible than that of the screening line. Everything from aftershave lotion to nail
clippers is examined when a passenger passes through these checkpoints. The impossible task of
screening hundreds of millions of passengers per year continues to be a main focus of policy
makers. The debate continues over the effectiveness of screening, and how to make it more
effective.
Policy formulation generally occurs in stages starting with identification of a problem
(such as the 9/11 screening failures). Next comes agenda setting or focusing the attention of mass
media and public officials on specific problems. Policies are then formulated through initiation
and development by policy-planning organizations, interest groups, government bureaucracies,
the President, and Congress. Then next phase is legitimating of policies by interest groups, the
President, and Congress. Implementation of policies is carried out largely by executive
government agencies. Finally, the policies are evaluated by government agencies, outside
consultants, the media, and the public (Dye, 1998, p. 317).
The aforementioned overview is an obvious oversimplification of the complexities of
governmental policy-making; however, it does illustrate how local knowledge, or mētis, is often
not considered when formulating policy. The formulation phase of policy making is supposed to
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consider the inputs of various organizations and interest groups but often times fail in that
endeavor. The result is a failure to consider the local knowledge and inputs from the very
individuals policymakers are purported to protect. Consider that current aviation security policy
completely failed to consult the rank and file pilots of the world’s largest airline, even though
they are the most affected and suffer the consequences of any breach of security. The bias is
unfortunate, however, because the individual does offer a unique viewpoint and substantial local
knowledge of a given situation. This apathy leads to the observation that individual participation
in policymaking is often simply overlooked (Anderson, 1994, p. 70).
Numerous factors clearly contribute to policymaking, which in turn affects perceptions of
employees, passengers and mangers of the nation’s airlines. A greater understanding of terrorism
and its causes, goals, and impact will further influence and shape attitudes and policies on how
best to combat this continuing threat. Anxiety over the attacks of 9/11 clearly remains high. How
do the nation’s pilots perceive the threat of terrorism? Should they be consulted on their opinions
about security related matters? If they are responsible for the safety of the aircraft then they
should observe a great deal of security issues. Where are the weak points? How have the media,
government policy, and airline policy affected perceptions? Moreover, do the pilots feel safe?
Are there significant, measurable differences among pilots as it pertains to age, sex, crew base,
political affiliation, or assigned type of aircraft? These and other questions are what this
researcher attempted to discover. In such findings may be useful in the formulation of future
policies.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this study was to explore the potential various dimensions of airline
security after 9/11 as perceived by pilots employed by American Airlines. These dimensions
were measured by distributing a 50-question survey that was statistically analyzed using factor
analysis and correlation. The data were used to reveal perceptions and observations of securityrelated matters from current American Airline pilots. It was hypothesized that American Airline
pilots would have a different perception of threats to air security from what is more commonly
propagated by current U.S. policy.
Participants
The population used for the study was all currently employed pilots of American
Airlines, as obtained via the Allied Pilots Association (APA) seniority list. The APA is the
collective bargaining union that represents all pilots who are employed by American Airlines.
The seniority list is rank ordered from the most senior pilot (employed with the company for the
longest period of time), to most junior (employed for the shortest period of time). The seniority
list only changes in the event of retirement, death, resignation or hiring of an existing or future
pilot. At the time of survey dissemination, there were 8,137 pilots on the seniority list.
The survey was designed to be taken by pilots who were currently employed by
American Airlines. The decision was made to make the survey available online via the Allied
Pilots Association website (www.alliedpilots.org). The union has a variety of functions and
committees that respond to the various needs of the membership. One of those is the safety and
security committee, which was contacted via telephone to arrange permission for the survey to
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be placed on the union website. The union frequently conducts and distributes various surveys to
its members using internal software and personnel.
Permission was granted after the union president and board of directors were made aware
of the reasons and content of the survey. The safety and security committee then placed a hard
copy of the survey into electronic format and placed it onto the APA website. An e-mail “blast”
was then sent out to all currently employed pilots informing them of the survey and its location
on the website. The survey remained on the website for 10 days in which 658 responses were
registered for a response rate of 8.08%.
Data Collection Instrument
The data collection instrument in this study was an on-line questionnaire
consisting of 50 questions divided into three parts: a demographics section that included
questions on age, experience, and education; a section concerning airline security including
questions on airport perimeter security, ramp security, and flight-deck security. The final section
consisted of questions designed to measure actual threat perceptions such as likelihoods of
various breaches of air security.
Data Analysis
Sample Characteristics
Univariate descriptives of the sample characteristics were analyzed for the following
variables: gender, crew base assigned, type of aircraft flown, international or domestic routes
flown, position assigned in the flight deck, years at American Airlines, previous military
experience, and political ideology. Gender was coded such that male = 1 and female 0. Crew
base describes the originating location of the crew member that is largely determined by
individual preference and organizational need. The following values were used to denote the 9
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crew bases located around the nation: Boston = 1, Washington DC = 2, Dallas = 3, Los Angeles
= 4, Miami, New York = 5, Miami = 6, Chicago = 7, San Francisco = 8, and Saint Louis = 9.
Aircraft category was also considered to be an important variable for consideration and
was coded as such: widebody = 1 (more than one aisle and the 757) or a narrowbody = 0, which
as only one aisle. Whether the pilots flew domestic or international routes was coded as such
international = 1 or domestic routing = 0, again based on needs of the company and seniority
preferences. Seniority and personal preference also determine whether a pilot is assigned as the
captain = 1 or first officer = 2. The distinction between captain and first officer is important
because the captain is ultimately responsible for the safe operation of the aircraft from the
moment the aircraft departs until it arrives at its destination. The first officer does not experience
the same level of responsibility as is imposed on the captain. The length of service for pilots at
American Airlines was measured in years. Finally, political ideology was included with the
following categories: very conservative = 1, conservative = 2, moderate = 3, liberal = 4 very
liberal = 5, and other = 6.
The results of univariate analyses indicate that the sample was predominately male
(96.6%) and occupied the rank of first officer (53.3%). Respondents ranged in age from 33 years
old to 62 years, with a mean of 48.8. The percentage of pilots who flew domestic routes was
54.8%, while 68.0% reported previous military experience. Additionally, the mean length of
service at American Airlines was 16.79 years, and 93.4% of respondents reported completing at
least a 4-year college degree. Finally, 62.3% of respondents listed their political ideology as
“conservative” to “very conservative.”
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The majority of respondents reported Dallas Fort Worth (26.8%) as their home base and
reported an aircraft type of wide body (50.9%) (See Table 1). Of the type of routes flown,
international or domestic, 55.3% reported flying domestic routes only.
Table 1
Univariate Sample Descriptives – Part A

Age
Valid

Gender

Crew Base

Aircraft Type

Route Type

638

638

639

633

635

2

2

1

7

5

Mean

48.816

.97

4.98

.51

.45

Median

49.000

1.00

5.00

1.00

.00

48.00

1

3

1

0

5.9390

.183

2.233

.500

.498

-.215

-5.115

.341

-.035

.213

.097

.097

.097

.097

.097

29.00

1

9

1

1

Missing

Mode
Std. Deviation
Skewness
Std. Error of Skewness
Range
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Table 2
Univariate Sample Descriptives – Part B

Valid
Missing
Mean
Median
Mode
Std. Deviation
Skewness
Std. Error of Skewness
Range

Years at

Highest Level of

Military

American

Education

Experience

Airlines

Completed

Political Ideology

635

628

639

634

5

12

4

6

.68

16.790

3.18

2.38

1.00

17.00

3.00

2.00

1

17.00

3

2

.467

6.71446

.601

.965

-.775

-.187

-.653

1.200

.097

.098

.109

.097

1

33.25

3

5
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Scale Development Perceived Risk
Using SPSS 15.0, responses to the 27 questions were subjected to a Principal Axis factor
analysis with an oblique rotation. Principal axis extraction was selected to reduce the probability
of capitalizing on errors in measurement typically enjoyed by the alternative method—Principal
Components analysis. To determine the appropriate number of factors the eigenvalues, scree
plot, and factor loadings were all analyzed.
The results of the Principal Axis factor analysis suggested the existence of seven unique
factors (using the eignvalues greater than 1 rule) (Gutman, 1954) that explained 67.02% of the
variance in the unrotated solution. Finally, to determine if seven factors was the most appropriate
factor solution, the salient variable rule was used. Here the threshold of practical significance
was > .30. That is, in order for a factor to be considered valid for extraction it must possess at
least three items with factor loadings > .30 (unless there are two items with factor loadings > .70)
and are capable of being named. (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994) (See Appendix A).
Factor 1 had 6 items with loadings > .30. Items 35 (Unattended aircraft are secured
sufficiently to prevent unauthorized entry), 32 (Aircraft cargo doors are secure when the aircraft
is left unattended), 18 (Unattended aircraft are adequately secured), 26 (Ramp worker entry
points employ adequate screening procedures), 22 (Ramp workers are effectively screened prior
to entering the ramp), and 29 (Ramp personnel follow security challenge procedures when
credentials aren’t displayed). As a result, Factor 1 was subsequently labeled “ramp security.”
Factor 2 had 5 items considered to be practically significant. Items 20 (The flight deck is
adequately secured from unauthorized access), 24 (Current policies regarding aircrew flight deck
entry and exit are sufficient to prevent unauthorized access), 16 (I am confident that no
unauthorized individuals can enter the flight deck), 12 (Flight deck doors are adequately
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reinforced to prevent unauthorized entry), and 21 (There are a sufficient number of Air
Marshal’s to deter in-flight terrorist attacks). Factor two was subsequently labeled as “Flight
deck security.”
Six items had factor loading > .30 on Factor 3. Items 15 (TSA screeners are adequately
trained to identify individuals who pose a threat to aircraft security), 11 (TSA screeners who do
not perform adequately will be disciplined), 14 (deleted due to cross loading with factor 1), 19
(TSA screening checkpoints are effective in identifying items that my be used to compromise
aircraft security), 27 (The TSA adequately screens all baggage), and question 13 (deleted due to
cross loading with Factor 2). Factor 3 was subsequently labeled as “passenger and luggage
screening.”
Factor 4 had four items considered to be practically significant. Item 34 (Flight
Attendants actively look for suspicious behavior), 31 (Passengers are likely to intervene in
threats to aircraft security), 28 (Passengers actively look for suspicious behavior), and item 37
(Flight Attendants actively look for contraband that may be used to compromise in-flight
security). Factor 4 was subsequently identified as “coproduction of in-flight safety.”
Factor 5 had 2 questions with correlation values of .30 or higher. Normally, three or more
indicators should be used for legitimacy. In the case of factor 5, two were used because the
values were greater than .70 (.864 and .760). The indicators are: question 17 (Air Marshals are
adequately trained to deal with threats to aircraft security), and question 25 (I feel confident of an
Air Marshal’s ability to handle a terrorist event in flight). Factor 5 was subsequently identified as
“air marshal protection.”
Factor 6 (4.292 total variance explained) had two questions with loadings > .70. Given
the magnitude of these loadings, 2 items are considered to sufficient to constitute a legitimate
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factor (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). Items 36 (Individuals acting nervous are more carefully
screened than those who appear calm) and 33 (Individuals displaying suspicious behavior receive
increased screening). Factor 6 was subsequently identified as “passenger profiling” (See
Appendix A—Item by Factor Loadings)
Scale Development of Perceived Threat
Using the data analytic techniques described above, the 13 potential questions measuring
pilots’ perceived risk were subjected to factor analysis. The results suggested that three factors
appropriately represented the factor solution and explained 61.86% of the variance in the
unrotated factor solution. Factor 1 possessed 7 salient variables. Items 50 (Terrorists will attempt
to compromise aircraft security by securing positions as legitimate airline employees), 48
(Terrorists will target airport perimeters to compromise aircraft security), 49 (Terrorists will
likely corrupt airline ground personnel into carrying out their directives), 40 (Terrorists will
likely penetrate an airport perimeter in order to carry out a terror event sometime in the near
future), 41 (I believe a missile attack against a U.S. commercial aircraft will happen sometime in
the near future), 47 (Terrorists will pose as flight personnel to gain access to aircraft in the near
future), and 42 (I believe there will be another terrorist attack onboard a U.S. commercial aircraft
sometime in the next five years. Although salient, item 44 was eliminated due to its crossloading with factor 2. Factor 1 was subsequently identified as “ground security breach.”
Factor 2 had two variables possessing practical significance. Items 38 (Weapons will
likely be brought through security checkpoints in the future) and 39 (Contraband that could be
used to compromise aircraft security passes through screening checkpoints). Question 44 was
eliminated due to cross-loading with factor 1. Factor 2 was subsequently identified as “screening
breach.” Similarly, Factor 3 (8.617 total variance explained) had only two items possessing
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practical significance. Items 45 (Terrorists will gain control over an in-flight aircraft in the near
future) and 46 (Terrorists will find a way to gain access to the flight-deck, while in-flight,
sometime in the near future). Factor 3 was subsequently identified as “in-flight takeover” (See
Appendix B—Item by Factor Loadings).
Reliability Analysis of Threat and Risk Perceptions
Cronbach’s alpha is an index of reliability associated with the variation accounted for by
the true score of an underlying construct. A construct is the hypothetical variable that is being
measured (Hatcher, 1994). Coefficient Alpha ranges in value from 0 to 1—where a high value
represents a reliable scale—and may be used to describe the reliability of factors extracted from
multipoint formatted questionnaires or scales (i.e., rating scale: 1 = disagree, 10 = agree.
Nunnally (1978) has indicated 0.7 to be an acceptable reliability coefficient in the early stages of
prediction or construct validation.
A reliability analysis of each of the factors suggests that the reliability for each of the
scales is sufficient for prediction purposes and fairly consistent with the solutions derived from
the factor analyses. To be sure, initial reliability analysis of Factor 1 (Ramp Security) with the 6
items suggested by the factor analysis yielded a coefficient α = .886. The results suggested
removing item 29. The subsequent coefficient α = .897 for the scale consisting of the remaining
five items. Similarly, the initial coefficient α reported for the proposed 5 items constituting factor
Flight Deck Security was .865. The analysis suggested removing item 21 (There are a sufficient
number of Air Marshals to deter in-flight terrorist attacks). The final scale consisting of four
items achieved α = .897. The reliability analysis for the remaining four factors—Passenger and
Luggage Screening, Coproduction of In-Flight Safety, Air Marshal Protection, Passenger
Profiling—all achieved acceptable α coefficients of .751, .756, .810, and .819, respectively,
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using the results suggested by the factor analysis. Finally, reliability analysis for the Perceived
Threat scales—Ground Breach, Screening Breach, and In-Flight Attack—all reported acceptable
levels of α (i.e., .853, .831, .926, respectively)
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
The primary purpose of this exploratory study was to understand the perceptions of
threats and risks to aviation as observed by American Airlines pilots. Following the events of
9/11, the United States dramatically transformed security policy to combat future terror events.
This researcher sought to document the perceived risk and potential threats facing airline security
among those possessing intimate and local knowledge of existing practices and conditions. More
specifically, this study tapped the perceptions of pilots not only to better understand the
potentially complex dimensions constituting airline security but to examine the extent to which
current practices and policies square with the risk and threat perceptions of those possessing
unique local knowledge.
To this end, a tripartite analytic approach was used. First, univariate descriptives were
used to examine the extent to which the sample data approximate the population of interest.
Factor and reliability analysis was then used to document the multidimensionality of the
constructs and assess the appropriateness of the linear combination of variables used to construct
the scales. Finally, correlation analysis was used to better understand which areas of airline
security might be targeted by policymakers to enhance existing structures and practices.
Interpretation of Pilot’s Perceived Risk
The results of the factor analysis indicate that perceived airline security risk consists of
several factors. Using the eigenvalues, scree plot, and salient variable rules, the solution deemed
most appropriate consists of 6 factors that explained 67.02% of the variance in the unrotated
solution. The eigenvalues for the six factors ranged from 8.650 to 1.159. Factor 1, which was
subsequently identified as “ramp security,” had the greatest eigenvalue (8.650). This suggests
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that ramp security is the most salient dimension constituting airline security among pilots at
American Airlines. In fact, the total variance explained by this single factor was 32.039% (See
Appendix A—Perceived Risk Factor Analysis)
The eigenvalue, which represents the variance explained of each of the factors, is only
one way by which pilot perceptions regarding ramp security can be interpreted. The eigenvalues
and variance explained only reflect the salience of the perceived factor relative to others.
Another method of understanding this and other dimensions is to assess the grand mean of the
scale by comparing it to the anchors employed within the scale and by comparing it to the grand
mean(s) for the other dimensions. Computation of the means for each of the items constituting
this scale indicate the item means ranged from 2.23 to 3.60 for the 6 items, with a grand mean of
2.91. When comparing this to the scale used in the survey with 1 being negative (strongly
disagree) and 10 being positive (strongly agree), a grand mean of 2.91 suggests that pilots don’t
perceive ramp security to be adequate (See Table E1—Ramp Security Means).
Using the same analytic strategy as above, “flight-deck security” was determined to be
the second most prominent perceived airline security factor among this group of pilots which
explained 10.528% of the variance in the unrotated solution. Computation of the means (See
Appendix F—Flight-Deck Security Means) revealed the item means ranged from 3.3742 to
5.3890 with a grand mean of 4.266. This suggests that pilots perceive flight deck security to be
only slightly better than ramp security.
It is clear that ramp safety and flight deck security are the two most prominent factors
constituting perceived airline security risk among pilots at American Airlines. More importantly,
these pilots perceived these two dimensions as being inadequate to protect against future threats.
An examination of the perceived adequacy of the remaining factors is also revealing. Passenger
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and luggage screening item means ranged from 3.033 to 4.34. The grand means was 3.46. This
suggests that pilots perceive ramp security, flight deck security, and passenger and luggage
screening to be inadequate.
The opposite is true for coproduction of safety, air marshal protection, and passenger
profiling. In fact, the mean of items for the coproduction of safety ranged from 5.44 to 7.44 with
a grand mean of 6.42, suggesting that pilots perceive this dimension of airline security to be
adequate. Finally the grand mean for air marshal protection and passenger profiling were 7.64
and 5.05, respectively. The results of this analysis suggest that of the 6 perceived risk factors
constituting airline security, this group of pilots only perceived the coproduction of safety on
flights and air marshal protection to be adequate, while perceptions regarding the remaining four
dimensions were that of inadequacy.
Interpretation of Pilots’ Perceived Threat
The results of the analysis of perceived risk among pilots not only revealed the
multidimensionality of the construct. In fact, perceived threat, as revealed by the factor analysis,
suggests that it consists of ground security breach, screening breach, and in-flight takeover which
explained 61.86% of the total variance in the unrotated solution. With respect to which
dimension of perceived threat was most salient among the pilots, it was ground security breach
as evidenced by an eigenvalue of 5.27, followed by screening breach and in-flight takeover.
With respect to the perceived likelihood of threats occurring, the threat perceived to be
most likely was a screening breach. In fact, the grand mean for this factor was 7.57 suggesting
that these pilots agree with the prospect of future screening breaches. What is more, these pilots
also agree with the possibility of a future ground security breach with a grand mean of 7.32.
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Finally, these pilots are largely undecided with respect to the possibility of a future in-flight
attack as revealed with a grand mean of 5.36.
Correlation Analysis
A Pearson’s correlation coefficient was analyzed for each factor in the scales generated
for this study. The correlations were then formed into a correlation matrix (See Table 3). The
Pearson r coefficient, which can range from –1 to +1, shows the linear relationship between two
variables. A negative value indicates a negative relationship (i.e., as one variable increases the
other variable decreases), while a positive value represents a positive linear relationship (i.e., as
one variable increases the other variable increases as well). A Pearson r value of zero indicates
no linear relationship between the two variables. Further, by squaring Pearson’s r, we can
determine the proportion of variance shared by the two variables.
Of the 3 risk factors identified by Principal Axis factor analysis (Ground security breach,
screening breach and in-flight takeover) in-flight takeover was evaluated to be the most
meaningful dependent variable for interpretation. First, Zero-order correlations were obtained
between all demographic and perceived risk variables. The only variable sharing a significant
linear relationship with one’s perceived risk of an in-flight takeover was gender (p < .01). The
results suggest that females are more likely to perceive a higher risk of an in-flight attack than
males. The strength of that relationship for all intents of purpose is weak (r = -.115). Neither
route (domestic vs. international) nor aircraft type (wide vs. narrow bodied) shared a significant
linear relationship. This is surprising because wide bodied aircraft were deliberately targeted by
the terrorists on 9/11 for their larger fuel capacity. What is more important, airport security
abroad differs drastically from one country to another and a defining characteristic of terrorists
groups is the ethnic delineation separating them from “Americans.” The increased proportion of
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ethnic travels on flights originating from other countries would seem to theoretically increase
risk perceptions.
Given this paucity of significant predictors of perceived risk of an in-flight takeover,
correlation analysis was then used to examine the degree of the linear relationship between the
six risk dimensions documented in this study. Not surprisingly, each of the six factors shared a
statistically and substantively strong linear relationship with an individual’s perceived risk of an
in-flight takeover to varying degrees. In other words, these six dimensions of airline security
went much further in predicting perceived threat than did any of the demographic variables
previously analyzed with considerable variability across the range of coefficients. The
correlation coefficient obtained between ramp security and in-flight takeover was r =-.274. This
suggests the strength between the two is modest and that individuals who perceive inadequate
levels of ramp security are more likely to perceive a risk of an in-flight takeover. The same is
true of flight-deck security, which had the strongest correlation coefficient (r = -.482).
Interestingly, passenger and luggage screening and coproduction of in-flight safety had near
identical coefficients r = -.228 and r = -.210, respectively.
This is somewhat surprising given that the most attention by policymakers to increase
airline security has focused on passenger and luggage screening while this other important
dimension—and less costly option—has received scant attention. This suggests that the
participants of this study felt that despite huge fiscal and human investment in screening
passenger and luggage, it is only slightly more effective than flight attendants and passengers
working together to identify and thwart any in-flight terror events. Air marshal and passenger
profiling were also statistically (p < .01) and substantively significant where r = .157 and r = .170, respectively, and in the expected direction.
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Table 3
Correlations:
Variable

In-Flight Takeover

In-Flight Takeover

1

Age

-.009

Gender

-.115(**)

Aircraft Type

.034

Route Type

.063

Rank

.003

Military Experience

-.092*

Years at AA

.048

Highest Level of Education

-.031

Political Ideology

-.033

Ramp Security

-.274(**)

Flight Deck Security

-.482(**)

Passenger and Luggage Screening

-.228(**)

Co-production of In-flight Safety

-.210(**)

Air Marshal Protection

-.157(**)

Passenger Profiling

-.170(**)

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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Partial Correlation
Given that some of the previously identified demographic variables (i.e., gender, military
experience, type of aircraft, and route) either theoretically or empirically shared a significant
linear relationship, partial correlation analysis was used to obtain fourth order correlation
coefficient (i.e., partialling the influence of gender, route type, aircraft type, and military
experience) to control for the potential confounding effects of these variables. The partial
correlation matrix revealed a slight change in the coefficient for Ramp Security from r = -.274 to
r = -.268, flight-deck security from r = -.482 to r = -.466, passenger and luggage screening from
-.228 to -.225, and coproduction of in-flight safety remained the same where r = -.210. (See
Table 4)
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Table 4
Partial Correlations:

IFT

RS

FDS

PLS

CIS

AMP

PP

IFT

----

-.268

-.466

-.225

-.210

-.130

-.164

RS

-.268

----

.553

.602

.181

.099

.278

FDS

-.466

.553

----

.486

.262

.261

.255

PLS

-.225

.602

.486

----

.257

.232

.424

CIS

-.210

.181

.262

.257

----

.337

.385

AMP

-.130

.099

.261

.232

.337

----

.238

PP

-.164

.278

.255

.424

.385

.238

----

______________________________________________________________________________
Control Variables are: gender, route type, aircraft type, and military experience.
Note. IFT = in-flight takeover, RS = ramp security, FDS = flight deck security, PLS = passenger
and luggage screening, CIS = coproduction of in flight safety, AMP = air marshal protection, PP
= passenger profiling.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION
The primary purpose of this exploratory study was to develop a reliable and valid scale
by which perceptions of airline pilots can be measured against existing as well as new aviation
security policies as they are implemented. Defining the threat of terrorism, discussing a
theoretical cause of terrorism, the media’s impact on individuals’ perceptions, and existing
emphasis on aviation security policy were all reviewed to add perspective and focus to the threat
facing currently employed American Airline pilots. The researcher disseminated a self-report
questionnaire designed to create a valid scale to measure risk and threat factors as perceived by
rank and file pilots of American Airlines. In additions, demographic variables that could
potentially have an influence on perceptions were included in the analysis.
Methodology
The current study used a self-report questionnaire distributed to the entire population of
currently employed American Airline pilots. The researcher created scales for perceived threat
and perceived risk factors using Principle Axis factor analysis. The researcher identified six risk
threat factors and three perceived threat factors for further analysis and interpretation.
Correlation and partial correlation analysis were used to further refine and interpret the results of
the newly developed perceived threat and risk factor scales.
Findings
Perceived Risk
Scale development using Principle Axis factor analysis resulted in six principle risk
factors identified as: 1. Ramp Security, 2. Flight Deck Security, 3. Passenger and Luggage
Screening, 4. Coproduction of In-Flight Safety, 5. Air Marshal Protection and 6. Passenger
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Profiling. Of these six factors, ramp security was identified as the most salient risk perceived by
pilots with an explained variance of 32.039%. Ramp security includes any employee who works
on or around the aircraft while it is at the gate including maintainers, baggage handlers, cleaning
crews, and caterers. Interestingly, none of these groups are made to proceed through traditional
screening checkpoints even though pilots are required to. This may be part of the reason pilots
perceive ramp security to be so high a risk.
To further interpret these risk factors the grand mean of each of the six factors was
analyzed. Ramp Security had a grand mean of 2.91 which, when interpreted against the survey
scale of 1-10 with a 1 being negative and a 10 being positive, illustrated that pilots perceive ramp
security to be highly inadequate. The same is true of flight deck security (10.528 % total
variance), which was the second most salient factor identified. Flight deck security includes the
flight deck door itself as well as procedures used for in-flight opening and closing of the door
(pilot may have to leave the flight deck during flight for physiological needs and flight attendants
open it to pass food and drinks to the pilots) Flight deck security had a grand mean of 4.266,
which is still in the “negative” range of the scales used, meaning pilots still viewed the security
of the flight deck to still be inadequate. Of the six risk factors, ramp security and flight deck
security were the two most prominent risk factors identified as inadequate to protect against
future threats. Passenger and luggage screening, which includes the security checkpoint so
familiar to air travelers in a post-9/11 world, had a grand mean of 3.46 revealing a very negative
impression of adequacy among pilots to go along with ramp security and flight deck security.
Perhaps more revealing were the three remaining risk factors of coproduction of in-flight
safety, air marshal protection and passenger profiling. Coproduction of in-flight safety, which
accounts for the combined actions of flight attendants and passengers in dealing with a threat,

61

had a grand mean of 6.42 suggesting a perception of adequacy. This is not surprising when
recalling the failed 9/11hijacking that crashed into a field in Pennsylvania. It was the combined
efforts of flight attendants and passengers that ultimately thwarted the terrorist’s intentions even
though it was not a “formal” security tactic. That “success” may well be why pilots view the
coproduction of in-flight safety as positive or adequate. Along that same logic, it stands to
reason that air marshal protection (grand mean of 7.64) would be perceived as highly adequate as
well. Air marshal manning numbers and flights assigned are kept secret for obvious security
reasons; however, pilots feel having them onboard (or the threat of having them onboard) would
contribute to lessening the risk of a terrorist incident. Profiling, which involves identifying
potential threats based solely on race, sex, or religion, had a grand mean of 5.05, revealing a
neutral or undecided attitude among pilots. That result is revealing from a sociological
perspective because those who are most at risk from terrorists don’t necessarily feel profiling
would be effective, despite the fact that all 19 hijackers on 9/11 were men of Middle Eastern
descent.
Of the six risk factors identified only coproduction of in-flight safety and air marshal
protection were viewed as adequate. The remaining four were viewed as inadequate, including
flight-deck security. Interestingly the flight deck doors of all airliners were upgrades in the
months and years that followed the attacks of 9/11. All of the time and money spent on those
upgrades have failed to assuage the concerns of pilots concerning an in-flight cockpit breach.
This is probably because the door is still opened and closed periodically during flight. Perhaps
most disconcerting is the low confidence level pilots have with passenger and luggage screening.
No other post-9/11 security change is as evident to the traveling public as passenger screening.
A total of 4.7 billion dollars (Government Accountability Office, 2008, p. 5) were spent during
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fiscal year 2007 directly on aviation security matters of the Transportation Security Agency,
whose main purpose is to screen all passengers and luggage for contraband that could be used in
a terrorist event. Despite this allocated money and man power, pilots still have exceedingly low
confidence in the ability of the TSA to do their job effectively. Additionally, despite this focus
on screening, pilots still view ramp security and not passenger screening to be the most salient
issue facing aviation security. This is not surprising considering ramp workers do not even
undergo the same screening that pilots and passengers do, even though that screening has been
deemed inadequate by this study. That begs the question: If ramp workers are not receiving even
cursory screening, then how safe can the ramp be? The results of this research seem to support
that concern.
Perceived Threat
Principle Axis factor analysis revealed three perceived threats to airline security. These
included 1.Ground Security Breach, 2.Screening Breach and 3. In-Flight Takeover. Ground
Security Breach, which was determined to be most salient, is the threat of a person or persons
breaching security and entering the ramp or perimeter of an airport in order to initiate a terror
event. The grand mean (7.32) corroborated this perception among pilots. Despite the emphasis
on screening since 9/11, the sheer volume of manpower and financial resources committed,
Screening Breach had the highest grand mean of 7.57, indicating a very strong perception of
threat among pilots. In other words, pilots, who are required to undergo the same screening as
passengers, perceive a screening breach to be the most likely threat facing the system. This is
shocking in light of the aforementioned resources allocated to closing the gaps in this vital
security layer. Pilots are in a unique position to observe screening because they have to undergo
the process every time they go to work. A typical month of flying may yield between 30 and 40
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screenings, which lends a great deal of credibility to pilot’s perceptions in the matter. The fact
that they feel as though it is still such a high threat does not bode well for current screening
policy.
Risk of In-Flight Takeover
The result of 9/11 happened because one terrorist on each of three aircraft was able to
enter the flight deck and secure it long enough to reach their objective. As discussed earlier, the
fourth aircraft crashed short of the objective due to a timely and brave passenger revolt.
Ultimately, all security procedures are designed to keep would be hijackers out of the flight deck.
Contrary to popular belief, the most destructive weapon on an aircraft is the controls. With those
a hijacker can turn the aircraft into a guided missile, which was illustrated all too well on 9/11.
Because of these reasons, In-Flight Takeover was evaluated to be the most meaningful dependent
variable for interpretation.
When demographics were measured against the risk of an in-flight takeover nothing other
than gender was determined to be statistically significant. For unexplained reasons, females
were more likely to perceive the risk of an in-flight attack. It is interesting that neither route
flown nor aircraft type shared a significant relationship with in-flight takeover. The type of
routes flown are generally domestic (within the U.S., Canada, or Mexico), or international (all
other destinations). It was expected that perhaps perceptions of foreigners boarding aircraft or a
lack of trust in foreign security at airports (they obviously vary by country), would have in
impact on perceptions, but they did not. The same goes for type of aircraft assigned, which is
either narrowbody (MD-80, Boeing 737) or widebody (Boeing 757, 767, 777 and Airbus A-330).
The 757 and 767 were the aircraft used in the attacks of 9/11 perhaps for the size and fuel load
able to be carried. It stands to reason that the larger the aircraft the greater the potential for
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destruction. Even so, no relationship was found, which reveals that pilots perceive all aircraft to
be equally vulnerable to attack, not just the type used on 9/11.
Correlation analysis was also used to examine the linear relationship between the six risk
dimensions previously cited. The risk of ramp security and flight-deck security correlated the
strongest with the threat of an in-flight takeover, which is not surprising. Pilots obviously
perceive a breach of ramp security or a less-than secure flight deck would greatly increase the
threat of in in-flight takeover. Breaching the ramp could lead to weapons or other contraband
being placed onboard the aircraft, thus circumventing the screening process. As previously
mentioned, ramp workers are not required to undergo the same screening that passengers and
pilots are required to. Each airport is different; however, many simply require the flash of a line
badge to gain access to the ramp. Also, tailgating, or following a fellow worker through a secure
door, is a potential problem that may be accounting for pilot’s perceptions in this area.
Perhaps the most revealing result of this research was the correlations between passenger
and luggage screening, coproduction of in-flight safety, and the threat of an in-flight takeover.
Many times throughout this paper passenger and luggage screening, as a front-line security
policy, has been highlighted and examined. The Transportation Security Administration or TSA
was mandated with assuming all screening functions following the failures of 9/11. Huge
amounts of resources were poured into the nascent agency in the hope of deterring future terror
events. Screening is looked at as the last line of defense from keeping a would-be terrorist off an
aircraft, and as such is certainly the most visible to the traveling public. Numerous GAO studies
have concluded that screening breaches still occur, despite this massive government investment.
As such, it is understandable that pilots perceive and correlate a screening breach so strongly
with the threat of an in-flight takeover.
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What is most revealing, however, is that the coproduction of in-flight safety correlates
nearly the same as passenger and luggage screening to the threat of an in-flight takeover. This
telling statistic potentially highlights an area that has been left untapped when formulating
security policy. Consider the example of the 9/11 crash of United Airlines flight 93. The
coproduction of in-flight safety, or in this case the teaming of passengers and flight attendants to
counteract a terrorist event, has largely been ignored as an effective counter terrorism strategy,
despite the fact is essentially has a 100% “success” rate (success defined as countering the
ultimate intentions of the hijackers).. Flight attendants can ask passenger to help assist them as a
part of airline policy, but only after an event has occurred. Consider that passengers who sit in an
emergency exit row are briefed by flight attendants on the exits operation and when to use it.
Passenger lives are at stake if passengers fail to execute their responsibilities. No such prior
coordination exists with a potential terrorist event. No announcements on what to do if someone
attempts to takeover the aircraft, how to assist flight attendants and when, whether or not to stay
seated or help block the flight deck, nor any other contingencies. Perhaps passengers could be
encouraged to report certain behaviors that may be deemed suspicious. At any rate, the
coproduction of in-flight safety clearly a powerful counter-terrorist force as evidenced by the
taking back of United Airlines flight 93 by passengers and flight attendants.
Limitations
A study of this magnitude and ambition is not without limitations. The decision was
made, due to time and budget constraints, to make the survey available to all currently employed
pilots of American Airlines. This precluded the necessity for a random sample, thus greatly
simplifying the process of gathering data. It was hoped that enough respondents would
participate; however, that was not the case, resulting in a low response rate of (8.05%) when
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factoring the population number of 8,169 pilots. With that being said, however, the researcher is
confident that a representative sample was achieved considering some of the actual
demographics closely matching the respondent’s demographics. For instance, DFW had the
highest response rate of 26.8% while having an actual rate of 24.4% of pilots at American
Airlines. Additionally, the breakdown of respondents was 53.7% first officer and 46.3% captain,
which compares closely with the actual rate of 53.3% and 46.7% respectively. Finally, those
who reported flying international routes (41%) and domestic routes (59%) again compared
closely with the actual rate of 45.2% and 54.8% respectively.
An additional limitation was that survey participation depended on logging in to the APA
website. This presupposes that potential respondents log in on a somewhat regular basis given
the survey ran for 10 days. Even if they did, they would then have to identify the survey and
navigate to its page. Potential respondents may start to take the survey and grow tired after some
questions and not pay as close attention to the remaining questions. The initial e-mail blast
announcing the survey may have been discarded by potential respondents.
One final limitation is that this survey was conducted at a single airline, albeit America’s
largest. The perceptions of varying demographics at other airlines, including smaller “regional”
airlines, could potentially vary from the perceptions discovered in this research. Any future
research should ideally account for the above limitations.
Implications
These findings suggest that local knowledge and perceptions of pilots have largely been
ignored in the formulation of aviation security policy. The juxtaposition of existing policy with
the perceptions of what pilots identify as significant threats and risks facing the aviation system
appear to be at odds. These finding seem to give credence to the concept of mētis as a valuable
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contributor in the formulation of public policy, most especially aviation policy. The local
knowledge of pilots can only be obtained through years of experience in the field and on the job.
Moreover, this knowledge can not be obtained through reports or briefings; therefore, it is
imperative it be used in the crafting of effective policy.
This study did provide important contributions to the existing literature regarding pilot
perceptions of security risks and threats confronting the U.S. aviation system. As of the writing
of this paper, no other significant survey of its kind has been found to exist. Therefore, these
scales are a potentially valuable contributor for policymakers to consider before developing
future aviation security policy.
Future Research
In the current exploratory study the perceptions of airline pilots employed at American
Airlines were measured, analyzed, and compared to existing aviation policy. The central thesis
highlighted the need for mētis or local knowledge to be considered when formulating security
policy. Too often this local knowledge is overlooked in policy making, to the detriment of
effective policy.
Future studies could apply the scales in this study to other airlines such as Delta, United,
and Southwest. Additionally, smaller airlines such as American Eagle, Comair, and Air Tran
could be considered as well. Additionally, any future research should include the perceptions of
flight attendants, considering they are integral cogs in the defense of potential in-flight takeover
attempts. Also, flight attendants are subjected to the same screening procedures and security that
pilots are exposed to; therefore, their perceptions in those areas could be enlightening.
One important change to any additional studies would be to change the sampling methods
from surveying the entire universe as the current study did, to a more traditional sample of the
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universe. Even though confidence is high that a representative sample was obtained in this
study, a more sound sampling method should provide greater statistical validity and reliability.
These suggestions for future research were beyond the scope of the present study; however, if
incorporated; they would add a dimension of refinement to a potentially valuable tool for the
implementation of sound public policy.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
Perceived Risk Factor Analysis
Table A1
Perceived risk factor total variance explained

Factor

Extraction Sums of Squared

Rotation Sums of

Loadings

Squared Loadings(a)

Initial Eigenvalues
% of

Cumulative

Total

Variance

%

Total

1

8.650

32.039

32.039

8.253

30.567

30.567

6.749

2

2.843

10.528

42.567

2.441

9.042

39.608

6.073

3

1.752

6.489

49.056

1.379

5.106

44.714

5.928

4

1.408

5.216

54.273

.957

3.545

48.259

3.210

5

1.247

4.620

58.893

.878

3.254

51.513

2.071

6

1.159

4.292

63.185

.650

2.408

53.921

2.422

7

1.037

3.839

67.024

.522

1.932

55.853

3.045

8

.845

3.128

70.152

9

.772

2.859

73.012

10

.702

2.601

75.612

11

.675

2.501

78.113

12

.625

2.314

80.427

13

.594

2.198

82.625

14

.547

2.026

84.651

15

.476

1.763

86.414

75

% of

Cumulative

Variance

%

Total

Factor

Extraction Sums of Squared

Rotation Sums of

Loadings

Squared Loadings(a)

Initial Eigenvalues
% of

Cumulative

Total

Variance

%

16

.454

1.680

88.094

17

.441

1.635

89.729

18

.385

1.425

91.153

19

.346

1.280

92.433

20

.337

1.250

93.683

21

.329

1.219

94.902

22

.303

1.121

96.023

23

.266

.984

97.007

24

.249

.922

97.928

25

.213

.790

98.718

26

.194

.717

99.435

27

.152

.565

100.000

Total
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% of

Cumulative

Variance

%

Total

Table A2
Perceived risk factor loading pattern matrix
Factor
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

c35

1.013

.022

-.222

.017

.015

.079

-.033

c32

.862

.000

-.178

.012

.004

.121

.020

c18

.853

.095

-.075

-.021

.055

.008

-.060

c26

.691

-.016

.190

-.060

.017

-.109

-.001

c22

.603

.004

.342

-.071

-.039

-.160

.021

c29

.460

-.132

.066

.148

.064

-.027

.207

c20

.098

.920

-.103

-.020

.013

.043

-.095

c16

.096

.816

-.034

-.057

.005

.066

-.066

c24

-.009

.764

-.087

-.027

.067

.000

.103

c12

-.110

.727

.130

.084

.005

-.082

-.083

c21

.038

.440

.098

-.034

-.140

.024

.244

c15

-.030

-.057

.822

-.048

.089

.159

-.097

c11

-.136

-.025

.596

-.014

.056

.128

-.028

c14

.353

.028

.515

.053

-.104

-.127

-.016

c19

.129

.075

.490

-.032

.072

.116

-.014

c27

.230

.055

.353

-.050

-.031

.046

.214

c13

.054

.339

.346

.207

-.038

-.095

-.064

c34

-.005

-.078

-.008

.842

.018

.011

-.062

c37

.145

-.022

.058

.659

-.082

.143

-.102

c28

-.004

.026

-.052

.598

.023

-.026

.121

c31

-.191

.173

-.092

.470

.097

-.043

.186

c17

.054

-.033

.077

.009

.864

.009

-.020

c25

.010

.062

.082

.021

.760

-.065

.028

c36

-.041

.029

.179

.047

-.054

.761

-.004

c33

.050

-.017

.160

.018

.003

.701

.067

c23

-.033

.022

.020

-.070

.035

.117

.524

c30

.075

-.091

-.140

.111

-.016

-.033

.514

77

Figure A1. Scree plot
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APPENDIX B
Perceived Threat Factor Analysis
Table B1
Perceived threat factor total variance explained
Rotation
Sums of

Component

Extraction Sums of Squared

Squared

Loadings

Loadings(a)

Initial Eigenvalues
% of

Cumulative

% of

Cumulative

Total

Variance

%

Total

Variance

%

1

5.267

40.513

40.513

5.267

40.513

40.513

4.890

2

1.655

12.733

53.245

1.655

12.733

53.245

2.590

3

1.120

8.617

61.862

1.120

8.617

61.862

3.307

4

.994

7.647

69.509

5

.799

6.149

75.657

6

.647

4.977

80.634

7

.570

4.388

85.022

8

.534

4.109

89.130

9

.421

3.241

92.371

10

.337

2.590

94.961

11

.267

2.056

97.016

12

.261

2.005

99.021

13

.127

.979

100.000

79

Total

Table B2
Perceived threat factor loading pattern matrix

Component
1

2

3

c50

.887

-.081

-.136

c48

.876

.057

-.157

c49

.818

-.169

-.100

c40

.709

.244

-.097

c41

.535

.024

.238

c47

.516

-.097

.322

c42

.493

.101

.305

c44

.438

.375

.055

c38

-.091

.932

.006

c39

.014

.900

.002

c45

.099

-.057

.863

c46

.158

-.034

.836

c43

.449

-.123

-.534
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Figure B1. Perceived threat factor analysis scree plot
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APPENDIX C
Reliability Analysis of Perceived Risk (Independent Variable) Scales
Scale: Ramp Security
Table C1
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's

N of

Alpha

Items

.864

6

I

Table C2
Item-Total Statistics
Cronbach's

Scale
Scale Mean

Variance if

Corrected

Alpha if

if Item

Item

Item-Total

Item

Deleted

Deleted

Correlation

Deleted

c35

15.5545

67.255

.761

.824

c32

15.5801

69.352

.685

.837

c18

15.7372

68.021

.756

.825

c26

15.9808

68.433

.718

.831

c22

16.4038

70.845

.720

.833

c24

13.8365

71.659

.417

.897

82

Scale: Flight Deck Security
Table C3
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's

N of

Alpha

Items

.865

5

Table C4
Item-Total Statistics
Scale

Cronbach's

Scale Mean

Variance if

Corrected

Alpha if

if Item

Item

Item-Total

Item

Deleted

Deleted

Correlation

Deleted

c20

17.1345

70.053

.809

.806

c16

17.8038

70.735

.762

.818

c24

16.5491

74.166

.696

.835

c12

15.9604

72.811

.641

.851

c21

17.9826

84.737

.538

.870

83

Scale: Passenger and Luggage Screening
Table C5
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's

N of

Alpha

Items

.740

4

Table C6
Item-Total Statistics
Scale

Cronbach's

Scale Mean

Variance if

Corrected

Alpha if

if Item

Item

Item-Total

Item

Deleted

Deleted

Correlation

Deleted

c15

10.6992

25.842

.615

.640

c11

9.5056

25.048

.433

.748

c19

10.4832

24.648

.592

.646

c27

10.8128

26.252

.517

.689

84

Scale: Coproduction of In-flight Safety
Table C7
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's

N of

Alpha

Items

.756

4

Table C8
Item-Total Statistics
Scale

Cronbach's

Scale Mean

Variance if

Corrected

Alpha if

if Item

Item

Item-Total

Item

Deleted

Deleted

Correlation

Deleted

c34

18.4105

26.665

.653

.645

c37

20.1390

26.683

.531

.713

c28

20.2093

26.348

.567

.692

c31

18.2204

31.257

.474

.739

85

Scale: Air Marshal Protection

Table C9
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's

N of

Alpha

Items

.810

2

Table C10
Item-Total Statistics
Scale

Cronbach's

Scale Mean

Variance if

Corrected

Alpha if

if Item

Item

Item-Total

Item

Deleted

Deleted

Correlation

Deleted

c17

7.3227

5.146

.688

.(a)

c25

7.9475

3.897

.688

.(a)

86

Scale: Passenger Profiling

Table C11
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's

N of

Alpha

Items

.819

2

Table C12
Item-Total Statistics
Scale

Cronbach's

Scale Mean

Variance if

Corrected

Alpha if

if Item

Item

Item-Total

Item

Deleted

Deleted

Correlation

Deleted

c36

5.1799

5.472

.696

.(a)

c33

4.9283

4.650

.696

.(a)
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APPENDIX D
Reliability Analysis of Perceived Threat (Dependent Variable) Scales
Scale: Ground Security Breach
Table D1
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's

N of

Alpha

Items

.853

7

Table D2
Item-Total Statistics
Scale

Cronbach's

Scale Mean

Variance if

Corrected

Alpha if

if Item

Item

Item-Total

Item

Deleted

Deleted

Correlation

Deleted

c50

43.3942

106.496

.663

.827

c48

43.7580

104.948

.697

.823

c49

43.8686

105.623

.561

.841

c40

43.7933

103.789

.654

.827

c41

44.3702

101.277

.597

.836

c47

45.2324

103.742

.553

.843

c42

43.6218

103.471

.617

.832

88

Scale: Screening Breach
Table D3
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach’s

N of

Alpha

Items

.831

2

Table D4
Item-Total Statistics

Scale

Cronbach's

Scale Mean

Variance if

Corrected

Alpha if

if Item

Item

Item-Total

Item

Deleted

Deleted

Correlation

Deleted

c38

7.7528

5.111

.721

.(a)

c39

7.3906

7.122

.721

.(a)

89

Scale: In-flight Takeover
Table D5
Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's

N of

Alpha

Items

.926

2

Table D6
Item-Total Statistics
Scale

Cronbach's

Scale Mean

Variance if

Corrected

Alpha if

if Item

Item

Item-Total

Item

Deleted

Deleted

Correlation

Deleted

c45

5.5079

6.781

.862

.(a)

c46

5.2333

6.736

.862

.(a)
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APPENDIX E
Means Analysis of Perceived Threat Scales
Table E1
Factor 1 Means (Ramp Security)
c35
N

Valid

Std. Deviation

c18

c26

c22

c29

632

630

635

633

635

634

8

10

5

7

5

6

3.0633

3.0492

2.8945

2.6493

2.2252

3.5962

2.04833

2.06395

2.02349

2.07003

1.89254

2.10717

c16

c24

c12

c21

Missing
Mean

c32

Table E2
Factor 2 Means (Flight-Deck Security)

c20
N

Valid
Missing

Mean
Std. Deviation

637

635

637

635

636

3

5

3

5

4

4.2214

3.5543

4.8006

5.3890

3.3742

2.62840

2.69679

2.62477

2.88062

2.28274
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Table E3
Factor 3 Means (Passenger and Luggage Screening)
c15
N

Valid

Std. Deviation

c19

c27

631

634

636

633

9

6

4

7

3.1315

4.3375

3.3475

3.0237

1.93386

2.44037

2.12307

2.08545

c28

c31

Missing
Mean

c11

Table E4
Factor 4 Means (Coproduction of In-Flight Security)
c34
N

Valid
Missing

Mean
Std. Deviation

c37

633

634

635

635

7

6

5

5

7.2559

5.5473

5.4394

7.4362

2.13490

2.39967

2.36710

1.98025
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Table E5
Factor 5 Means (Air Marshal Protection)
c17
N

Valid

633

633

7

7

7.9573

7.3175

1.97205

2.27228

Missing
Mean
Std. Deviation

c25

Table E6
Factor 6 Means (Passenger Profiling)
c33
N

Valid
Missing

Mean
Std. Deviation

c36

631

632

9

8

5.1823

4.9225

2.34488

2.15604
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APPENDIX F
Means Analysis of Perceived Risk Scales
Table F1
Factor 1 Means (Ground Security Breach)
c50
N

Valid

c49

c42

635

631

634

635

6

7

7

5

9

6

5

7.9211

7.5592

7.4581

7.5370

6.9540

6.0946

7.6835

2.05149 2.06080

2.36307

2.22825 2.55531

2.52267

2.35942

Factor 2 Means (Screening Breach)
c38
Valid
Missing

Std. Deviation

c47

633

Table F2

Mean

c41

633

Mean

N

c40

634

Missing

Std. Deviation

c48

c39

636

636

4

4

7.3836

7.7516

2.67222

2.25910
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Table F3
Factor 3 Means (In-flight Takeover)
c45
N

Valid
Missing

Mean
Std. Deviation

c46

634

631

6

9

5.2208

5.5151

2.59574

2.60817
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APPENDIX G
SURVEY INSTRUMENT
Section I
Please answer each question by marking the appropriate response or filling in the blank space
provided
What is your current age in years?
What is your gender?
 Male  Female
What is your current crew base?
 New York  Miami  L.A.  Dallas  Washington
 Boston  San Fran  St. Louis  Chicago  Other
Do you currently fly narrowbody or widebody?
 Narrowbody  Widebody
Do you currently fly domestic or international?
 Domestic
 International
Are you currently a Captain or First Officer?
 Captain
 First Officer
Are you a former military pilot?
Yes  No
How many total years have you been flying for American Airlines?
What is the highest level of education you have successfully completed?
 High School  2 year college degree  4 year college degree
 Some graduate  Graduate degree
How would you describe your political affiliation?
 Very Liberal  Liberal  Moderate  Conservative  Very Conservative  Other
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Section II
Indicate how strongly you Agree or Disagree with the following statements by clicking the
number that best represents your opinion. For example, if you Strongly Disagree with a
statement you would check 1, and if you Strongly Agree with a statement, you would check 10.
1. Strongly Disagree

10. Strongly Agree

TSA screeners who do not perform adequately will be disciplined.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SD           SA
Flight deck doors are adequately reinforced to prevent unauthorized entry.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SD           SA
Flight Attendants are adequately trained to handle terror events.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SD           SA
Ramp workers receive adequate background checks.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SD           SA
TSA screeners are adequately trained to identify individuals who pose a threat to aircraft security.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SD           SA
I am confident that no unauthorized individuals can enter the flight deck.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SD           SA
Air Marshals are adequately trained to deal with threats to aircraft security.
SD       

   SA
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PAGE 3
Unattended aircraft are adequately secured
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SD           SA
TSA screening checkpoints are effective in identifying items that my be used to compromise aircraft security.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SD           SA
The flight-deck is adequately secured from unauthorized access.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SD           SA
There are a sufficient number of Air Marshal’s to deter in-flight terrorist attacks.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SD           SA
Ramp workers are effectively screened prior to entering the ramp.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SD           SA
TSA screening procedures are uniformly applied to all persons regardless of an individual’s racial demographics.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SD           SA
Current policies regarding aircrew flight deck entry and exit are sufficient to prevent unauthorized access.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SD           SA
I feel confident of an Air Marshal’s ability to handle a terrorist event in flight.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SD           SA
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PAGE 4
Ramp worker entry points employ adequate screening procedures.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SD           SA
The TSA adequately screens all baggage.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SD           SA
Passengers actively look for suspicious behavior.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SD           SA
Ramp personnel follow security challenge procedures when credentials aren’t displayed.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SD           SA
Children are subject to the same search criteria as adults.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SD           SA
Passengers are likely to intervene in threats to aircraft security.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SD           SA
Aircraft cargo doors are secure when the aircraft is left unattended.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SD           SA
Individuals displaying suspicious behavior receive increased screening.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SD           SA
Flight Attendants actively look for suspicious behavior.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SD           SA
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PAGE 5
Unattended aircraft are secured sufficiently to prevent unauthorized entry.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SD           SA
Individuals acting nervous are more carefully screened than those who appear calm.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SD           SA
Flight Attendants actively look for contraband that may be used to compromise in-flight security.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SD           SA
Weapons will likely be brought through security checkpoints in the future.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SD           SA
Contraband that could be used to compromise aircraft security passes through screening checkpoints
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SD           SA
Terrorists will likely penetrate an airport perimeter in order to carry out a terror event sometime in the near future.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SD           SA
I believe a missile attack against a U.S. commercial aircraft will happen sometime in the near future.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SD           SA
I believe there will be another terrorist attack onboard a U.S. commercial aircraft sometime in the next five years
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SD           SA
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PAGE 6
Air Marshal’s are able to prevent threats to aircraft security.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SD           SA
Baggage containing explosives will eventually get through screening checkpoints.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SD           SA
Terrorists will gain control over an in-flight aircraft in the near future.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SD           SA
Terrorists will find a way to gain access to the flight-deck, while in-flight, sometime in the near future.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SD           SA
Terrorists will pose as flight personnel to gain access to aircraft in the near future
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SD           SA
Terrorists will target airport perimeters to compromise aircraft security
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SD           SA
Terrorists will likely corrupt airline ground personnel into carrying out their directives.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SD           SA
Terrorists will attempt to compromise aircraft security by securing positions as legitimate airline employees.
SD       

   SA
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